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Abstract
Practical reasoning and automated planning are strictly re-
lated as they strive to answer to the same question: “which
is the best course of action for an agent?” While the first re-
search field addressed this topic mainly from an epistemologi-
cal point of view, automated planning dealt with this question
for the most partfrom a heuristic or reasoning perspective.
In this position paper we want to discuss the improvements
in terms of computational complexity of algorithms, and of
knowledge representation and reasoning power on complex
planning problems, which can be derived by applying practi-
cal reasoning techniques to planning problems. In particular,
we sketch how argumentation-based structures for practical
reasoning may help for improving the computational com-
plexity of a state-of-the-art approach in optimal planning.
Introduction
The (McCarthy & Hayes 1987) seminal paper distinguishes
between two parts of intelligence: the epistemological and
the heuristic (or reasoning). The epistemological part is the
representation of the world in such a form that the solution of
problems follows from the facts expressed in the representa-
tion. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of
the information solves the problems and decides what to do.
Searching for the “best” (w.r.t. some criteria) course of
action for an agent is one of the most challenging topic in
AI at it has been addressed for the most part in two research
areas. Practical reasoning, one of the two areas, is mostly
focused on the epistemological part of this topic, and thus,
as noticed in (Girle et al. 2003), it is often seen as domain-
dependent reasoning. Indeed, a decision support system for
any given domain would have to take account of salient fea-
tures of the domain in which the reasoning takes place. A
completely general system would, therefore, have to “model
the world”.
On the other hand, the most prominent approach for deal-
ing with the heuristic part of this challenging topic has been
named as automated planning. While planning is defined as
the deliberation process that chooses and organises actions
by anticipating their expected effects, automated planning is
(Ghallab, Nau, & Traverso 2004) the area of artificial intelli-
gence that studies this deliberation process computationally.
Its aim is to support the planning activity by reasoning on
conceptual models, i.e. abstract and formal representation of
the domain, of the effects and the combinations of actions,
and of the requirements to be satisfied and the objectives to
be achieved. Generally, automated planning is domain in-
dependent, since only a formal representation of the state of
the world and of actions (with preconditions and effects) is
considered.
This means that from the epistemological part, the domain
of automated planning is a very simple and constrained rep-
resentation of reality, therefore it seems a good candidate
for being analysed through practical reasoning approaches,
which is the main idea underlying this position paper. In
particular, we will consider those approaches in practical
reasoning lying on argumentation theory. An argumenta-
tion system is mainly a way for modelling both common-
sense and formalised defeasible knowledge, and to deter-
mine the “coherent” or “consistent” pieces of knowledge.
As described in (Prakken & Vreeswijk 2002), an argumen-
tation system requires five elements: an underlying logical
language, definitions of an argument, of conflicts between
arguments and of defeat among arguments and, finally, a
definition of the assessment of arguments, which can be
used to define a notion of defeasible logical consequence.
In the context of practical reasoning, arguments and con-
flicts are usually defined using argument schemes and criti-
cal questions (Walton, Chris, & Macagno 2008). Usually,
e.g. (Atkinson & Bench-Capon 2007), these approaches
rely to the abstract argumentation frameworks (Dung 1995)
(AF ), or on its extensions, as a way for determining the as-
sessment of arguments. Indeed an AF is composed by a
set of arguments seen as atomic elements (the inner struc-
ture is left unspecified, this is why it is called abstract, and
why an argumentation framework can be built on the top of
a set of instances of argument schemes), and an attack rela-
tion among them. Given this very simple formalisation, the
choice of a semantics leads to a set of extensions each of
which is a set of arguments that are collectively acceptable
according to the given semantics. Different semantics select
different sets of arguments. For instance, stable semantics
selects the sets of arguments attacking any argument not in
the extension, while complete semantics chooses the sets of
arguments that are collectively acceptable (no argument at-
tacks another argument in the set, and if an argument not in
the set attacks an argument in the set, then the attacker is in
turn attacked by an argument in the set).
Exploiting argumentation based approaches for practical
reasoning in a planning context can lead to two main di-
rections: from one point of view widely studied problems
can be addressed from a different prospective and this may
lead to an improvement on the algorithms used for solving
them. From another point of view, we could deal with is-
sues related to planning with uncertainty by exploit the large
corpus of studies in the context of nonmonotonic reason-
ing and argumentation theory. For instance, (Dung 1995)
shows how an argumentation framework can encompass ap-
proaches like logic programming with negation as failure or
Reiter’s default logic (Reiter 1980), and more recently prob-
abilistic reasoning and reasoning with preferences emerged
as hot topics in argumentation community.
Due to space limit, in this position paper we will dis-
cuss briefly how seeing automated planning as a practi-
cal reasoning problem could lead to an improvement of
current approaches in the case of study we considered,
namely optimal planner SatPlan (Kautz & Selman 1992;
1999). A very preliminary discussion on planning with un-
certainty is provided in the conclusions.
A Case of Study: Optimal Planning
First of all, we consider a planning problems in a STRIPS-
like language composed by function-free first-order literals
under the closed-world assumption. Formally, a planning
problem is a tuple M = 〈Ψ, A,G〉 where Ψ is the goal of
the planning problem, viz. a set of ground literals represent-
ing the initial facts, A is a set of actions, and G is a set of
ground literals. An action α = 〈P(α),X(α)〉 is composed
by a set of preconditions and a set of effects. A solution plan
to a planning problem is a linearly ordered finite sequence.
Moreover, we assume an incompatibility relation as a sym-
metric non transitive relation on the set of literals. A set of
literals is contradictory if at least two literals in this set are
incompatible; otherwise it is non-contradictory.
In this paper, given a planning problem, we will focus on
the problem of finding a makespan optimal solution plan.
This is known to be an NP-complete problem. Among
the outstanding approaches aimed at solving this problem,
at the current stage of this research we considered a sin-
gle case of study, namely SatPlan (Kautz & Selman 1992;
1999), which is based on the Graphplan’s planning graph
(Blum & Furst 1997). A planning graph is a directed acyclic
leveled graph that alternates between a proposition level, i.e.
a set of problem propositions, and an action level, i.e. a set
of ground actions, and a set of special dummy actions, called
no-ops, which propagate propositions of the previous level
to the next one. If an action is in the graph, then its pre-
conditions and effects appear in the corresponding proposi-
tion levels of the graph. SatPlan (Kautz & Selman 1992;
1999) uses a preprocessing algorithm to compute a lower
(possibly exact) bound k of the optimal planning horizon. It
converts the planning graph, constructed up to the length k,
into a SAT problem, i.e., a propositional formula encoding
the planning problem. If the SAT problem is solvable (there
exists a variable assignment that satisfies the formula), a plan
with at most k time steps can be derived. If the SAT problem
is unsolvable (the formula is unsatisfiable), SatPlan gener-
ates a larger SAT problem using an increased bound (k+ 1),
and so on, until the first satisfiable formula is reached.
While encoding a planning problem as a SAT problem
gives the advantage of reusing the large corpus of efficient
SAT algorithms, usually the starting value of k, computed
by SatPlan, is significantly lower than the length of the op-
timal actual plan, therefore several useless unsolvable SAT
instances are generated, in order to find the optimal solu-
tion. Moreover existing SAT-solvers are “blind” w.r.t. the
structure of the planning problem since they consider only
the SAT encoded problem, thus they do not reuse previously
obtained results.
From a practical reasoning point of view, the problem of
finding a makespan optimal plan is analogous to answer to
the question: what action should I execute at time t? From
an epistemological point of view, this requires to build an
argumentA, whose scheme encompasses the following four
elements:
1. the name of the action aA ;
2. the time when an action should be executed tA ;
3. the non-contradictory set of literals that are the precondi-
tions required by the action PA ;
4. the non-contradictory set of literals that are the effects of
the action CA .
Therefore, a makespan optimal plan is represented by the
minimal sets of arguments suggesting timed actions that
once linearly ordered are the makespan optimal plan.
For a clearer comparison with SatPlan, let us recall two
inconveniences of it:
Q1: it requires to iteratively increment the bound of the plan-
ning graph thus requiring to build several graphs and to
evaluate them;
Q2: the evaluation of each planning graph requires to solve the
whole associated satisfiability problem, and intermediate
results cannot be reused at subsequent steps.
Let us see how argumentation can address these two is-
sues and let us call this approach ARGOPTPLAN. Let us
suppose that ARGOPTPLAN builds the planning graph re-
sulting from a planning problem up to a length l equal or
higher than the optimal one1. Then, it determines the rele-
vant part of the planning graph, namely the subgraph con-
taining all the paths, also including no-ops, from the initial
facts, leading to the goal literals at the higher propositional
level (Brafman 2001). The relevant part of the planning
graph can thus be encoded as a set of arguments, which are
instances of the argument scheme shown before.
From the set of arguments obtained at the step before, AR-
GOPTPLAN should apply the following rules for determin-
ing if an attack is in force between two arguments Ax and
Ay:
1. if either the preconditions, or the effects of two actions are
conflicting, or if the effects of one action are incompatible
with the preconditions of another action, and they should
be executed at the same time, then the arguments support-
ing these two actions are mutually conflicting (Ax attacks
Ay ifAx 6= Ay and tAx = tAy and (PAx ∪PAy is con-
tradictory or CAx ∪ CAy is contradictory or CAx ∪PAy is
contradictory)); or
1The value of l can be derived through efficient existing tech-
niques like (Gerevini, Saetti, & Vallati 2011).
2. if the effects of an action are incompatible with the pre-
conditions of another action that should be executed at the
subsequent level, then the argument considering the first
action has to attack the argument in favour of the second
action (Ax attacks Ay if Ax 6= Ay and tAx = tAy − 1
and CAx ∪ PAy is contradictory).
If an attack between two arguments holds according to
conditions of the point 1 above, then the actions suggested
by these arguments are mutually exclusive according to
(Blum & Furst 1997)’s terminology (viceversa not neces-
sarily holds). Moreover, conditions of point 2 deal with the
case where an action at a given level prevent the execution
of an action at a subsequent level, and this is not considered
in (Blum & Furst 1997) as its mutual exclusion relationships
are between propositional nodes, whileARGOPTPLAN con-
siders conflicts among arguments each of which supports the
execution of a specific action at a specific time.
Given the set of arguments and attacks, ARGOPTPLAN
can then derive a (Dung 1995)’s argumentation framework
(AF ) 〈A,→〉, where A is a set of arguments, and →⊆
A × A is an attack relation. An AF is representable as
a direct graph where the nodes are the arguments, and the
edges are the attacks. In order to address both the issues
highlighted before, let us consider a recently new semantics
(Baroni, Giacomin, & Guida 2005) called CF2.
The idea is that (i) the AF is partitioned into its SCCs
thus forming a partial order. Then (ii) the initial SCCs are
considered and the maximal conflict-free2 sets on them are
computed. For each possible choice determined at (ii), the
nodes attacked within subsequent SCCs are suppressed (iii).
Steps (i) to (iii) are then applied recursively on the restricted
AF s obtained at (iii).
More formally, given an argumentation frameworkAF =
〈A,→ 〉, let ECF2(AF ) the set of CF2 extensions of AF ;MCF(AF ) be the set of maximal conflict-free sets of AF ;
SCCSAF be the set of strongly connected components of
AF ; for any E,S ⊆ A, UPAF (S,E) = {Ax ∈ S | @Ay ∈
E : Ay /∈ S,Ay → Ax}, and AF↓UPAF (S,E) be the re-
striction3 of AF to UPAF (S,E). Then, a set E ⊆ A is an
extension of CF2 semantics, i.e. E ∈ ECF2(AF ), if and
only if:
• E ∈MCF(AF ) if |SCCSAF | = 1
• ∀S ∈ SCCSAF (E ∩ S) ∈ ECF2(AF↓UPAF (S,E)) oth-
erwise.
We can here sketch the prove that given a planning graph
built up to a level l, if exists a makespan optimal plan P of
length n ≤ l, then the arguments associated to the actions
in P are altogether in at least one of the CF2 extensions
generated from the relevant part of the planning graph of
length l. Indeed we know that at each level of the planning
graph each action can be executed only if its preconditions
are satisfied either from other actions at the previous level,
or from no-ops. Therefore, only the sequences of actions
2Given a generic AF 〈A,→〉: S ⊆ A is conflict-free if
@Ax,Ay ∈ S s.t. Ax → Ay.
3The restriction of AF to S ⊆ A is the argumentation frame-
work AF↓S = 〈S,→ ∩(S × S)〉.
not conflicting each other need to be identified. Since AR-
GOPTPLAN, as described before, considers all the incom-
patibilities among preconditions and postconditions, there is
a bijective correspondence between incompatibilities among
actions, and attacks among derived arguments. From this we
can infer that the set of derived arguments of the sequence of
actions composing a plan is always conflict-free, and obvi-
ously this set of derived arguments is a subset of a maximal
conflict-free set. From (Baroni, Giacomin, & Guida 2005)
we have that each CF2 extension is a maximal conflict-free
set, therefore we need to prove that the set of derived argu-
ments on the optimal plan is contained in a CF2 extension.
By construction, theAF derived by ARGOPTPLAN consists
of more than one SCCs: in particular ARGOPTPLAN starts
computing the extensions from the set of arguments derived
from the first level of the planning graph, identifying the
maximal conflict-free sets in it. These maximal conflict-free
sets clearly represent the actions that can be executed at the
beginning of a plan. Then, incrementally, the attacks from
the argument in these maximal conflict-free sets against ar-
guments outside them sets are considered, and they are en-
larged by the arguments that are unattacked. This recur-
sive process ends only when no additional argument can be
added to the conflict-free sets. Therefore, a optimal solution
plan has to be included in a CF2 semantics by construction.
This prove that a makespan optimal solution plan is deriv-
able from the set of CF2 extensions. In particular, it is rep-
resented by those extensions where actions making true the
goal’s literals are suggested to be executed at the same ear-
liest time. This addresses Q1: indeed, ARGOPTPLAN does
not need to iteratively build several planning graph each time
with higher bound limit, since it can find the optimal solu-
tion and demonstrate its optimality, even if it is not of the
same length of the planning graph at hand.
Moreover, an argumentation framework built in such a
way enjoys favourable computational characteristics. In-
deed, it will have a strong directionality (the attacks will be
between arguments supporting actions at the same time, or
from arguments supporting actions at a specific time against
arguments at immediately subsequent time, but never the
viceversa) and it will never be composed by a single SCC.
Therefore, we do not need to consider the whole argumen-
tation framework at a glance (which is what SatPlan does
when it transform the whole planning graph into satisfia-
bility formulae), while we can build the extensions incre-
mentally using memoization techniques. This provides an
enhancement in the direction of overcoming Q2.
Conclusions
The aim of this position paper is far from proposing a com-
plete planning system and comparing it with the state-of-the-
art approaches. Rather it is to show that looking at a plan-
ning problem from an argumentation-based point of view
can open a wide spread of research directions that may af-
fect both the computational side of automated planning, and
the representation and computation of complex problems.
As a very preliminary case of study, in this short paper
we briefly discussed how argumentation could be used for
ameliorating the underlying idea of SatPlan optimal planner,
namely the need of building incrementally several planning
graphs, and the fact that it requires to find a satisfiability
assignment of the whole set of formulae each time. From
the previous discussion, it seems that an approach like AR-
GOPTPLAN may reuse already computed partial solutions,
and that it could just require to build a single planning graph
rather than severals. This is just a preliminary idea, far from
being unquestionable and clearly we are working for imple-
menting ARGOPTPLAN and testing whether or not it is more
efficient than other optimal planner.
The idea of using argumentation theory for computing
plans is not original, as it has been considered in (Garcı´a,
Garcı´a, & Simari 2008; Pardo et al. 2011; Amgoud, De-
vred, & Lagasquie-Schiex 2011): the first considers partial
order planning only, the second addresses the problem of
building a plan in a cooperative way among a set of agents
through the cooperation of a set of agents, while the third
is focused on the computation of possible intentions of an
agent. The proposed approach, instead, shows a direct cor-
respondence between planning specific structures, the plan-
ning graph, and argumentation semantics, the CF2 seman-
tics, and how this can overcome weakness in existing ap-
proaches.
As mentioned in the introduction, argumentation-based
practical reasoning may lead to improvements in the field
of planning with uncertainty. Concerning the second type of
improvement we may obtain, the most relevant are clearly
in the context of planning with uncertainty. This relatively
young research topic has considered three cases of uncer-
tainty (Ghallab, Nau, & Traverso 2004): partial observ-
ability (i.e. different states may be indistinguishable), non-
determinism (i.e. actions with non deterministic effects),
and extended goals (i.e. goals with priorities). The us-
age of argumentation-based approaches for dealing with
the above cases may be fruitful. Indeed, as to the first
kind of uncertainty, while adopting a probabilistic approach
this would lead to an infinite search space, dealing with
it by a non-monotonic logic approach like (Reiter 1980;
Dung 1995) or an evolution of argument scheme for encom-
passing defaults and/or assumptions would allow to do cer-
tain reasoning from uncertain and defeasible premises that
further knowledge may invalidate. Moreover, the second
kind of uncertainty is generally analysed through a prob-
abilistic approach assigning different values to the various
effects of the action. In this context, several attempts in ar-
gumentation theory, e.g. (Hunter 2012), are aimed at rep-
resenting probabilistic knowledge and at reasoning with it.
Finally, preferences in argumentation for practical reason-
ing is currently one of the most active research topic in ar-
gumentation theory and practical reasoning community, e.g.
(Modgil 2009).
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